










EU FUNDS PROVIDED TO THE NEW 
MEMBER STATES: RELEVANCE FOR ODA 




■   Jaroslaw Pietras 
  DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE 
Geneva, Switzerland 
 













EU Funds Provided to the New Member States: Relevance for Official 




Jaroslaw Pietras Ph.D. 









II. The approach of achieving progress via integration with EU funds in the case of the New 
Member States (NMS), associated countries with the EU, and other countries of the region 
using EU funds as an instrument for enhancing cooperation.....................................................4 
 
III. Rules and experience in absorbing EU funds as an aid for transforming the New Member 
States, associated countries with the EU, and other countries of the region using EU funds as 
instrument for enhancing cooperation......................................................................................16 
 
IV. Final  remarks on the applicability of the experience concerning EU assistance offered to 
the New Member States from Central Europe or associated countries from Eastern Europe to 






                                                 
1 This paper was produced as a background document for the UNECE for the Follow-up International 
Conference on Financing for Development in Doha, Qatar, November 2008. Financial assistance was 
provided by the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC).  
UNECE DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, No. 2009.1 January 2009 
EU Funds Provided to the New Member States: Relevance for ODA and Monterrey    2
I.  Introduction 
  
The Monterrey Consensus addresses several sets of issues including ways and means 
for mobilizing domestic financial resources which could be used for development, enhancing 
foreign direct investments and other private capital flows which could contribute to 
development, accelerating international trade as an engine for growth as well increasing 
international financial and technical cooperation aiming at accelerating development. The 
Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey addressed the two issues of the 
necessary “means” (i.e. financing) and the most effective “ways” (i.e. aid effectiveness) of 
achieving the internationally agreed development goals including the objectives of the 
Millennium Declaration. These are two mutually reinforcing objectives, and progress should 
be made on both.  
These two objectives – even if Monterrey consensus covers more aspects – have been 
visible and still are valid concerns of the European Union not only in its relationships with 
developing countries but also in relation to its closest neighbours. Therefore, there might be a 
valid question whether and to what extent the experience of the EU obtained while assisting 
the transformation of the former centrally planned economies and helping them to adjust to 
the requirements of accession could give any indication how relatively substantial amounts of 
assistance can be effectively used by recipient countries. The EU’s former and current 
neighbours do not represent a uniform group of states. Some of them have already become 
members of the EU while some others, even being in geographic proximity, are far from the 
EU in political terms. Therefore, the sort of ties linking these countries with the EU differs 
very substantially, not only in formal or legal terms, but also as to extent, scope and 
instruments of the assistance.  It is interesting to note however, that the EU has a similarly 
complex approach to different groups of countries, always attempting to insure coherence 
between the various mechanisms affecting the pace of development. Direct applicability of 
this experience to the Monterrey process is not possible, but some observations concerning 
the factors which contributed to the success of transformation, association and accession 
might have more universal meaning. 
 The EU contributed to the positive result of the Monterrey Conference, through the 
so-called “Barcelona commitments” which included: 
- Commitments on Official Development Assistance (ODA), in terms of volume and 
sources – increased ODA volumes, innovative sources of financing, initiatives concerning 
GPG and debt relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC); 
- Commitments on aid effectiveness assuming closer coordination of policies and 
harmonisation of procedures, untying of aid, trade-related assistance (TRA), and the reform of 
the International Financial System.   3
In order to assist poorer countries worldwide, the EU has created the European 
Development Fund (EDF). This became the major tool for financial support of development 
at the EU level. It doesn’t means that the EU as a whole does not finance specific actions or 
projects also directly from the EU budget, however generally these other sources are of lesser 
importance and they address more specific needs. This is the case, for example, of 
humanitarian assistance or similar EU budget lines. Moreover, the European Development 
Fund should be seen as a supplement to the assistance offered separately by the EU member 
states. The proportion of aid originating from individual EU members is a number of times 
bigger when compared to amounts contained in EDF or other EU funds offered as 
development aid. This is not the case of the countries around the EU because bilateral aid 
donated by the individual member states is quite modest. 
Current financing of EDF covers the period from 2008 to 2013 and provides an overall 
budget of EUR 22.7bn. Of this amount, EUR 21.9bn is allocated to the ACP countries and 
EUR 430 million to the Commission as support expenditure for programming and 
implementation of the EDF. The amount for the ACP countries is divided accordingly: EUR 
17.7bn to the national and regional indicative programmes, EUR 2.7bn to intra-ACP and 
intra-regional cooperation and EUR 1.5bn to Investment Facilities. This should be compared 
to the overall amount of EU ODA which in the year 2006 only reached the amount of EUR 48 
billion thus representing a ratio as high as 0.42% of EU ODA to EU GNI. It confirms that the 
bilateral aid of particular member states constitutes the biggest part of all the assistance by the 
EU and its member states combined. Moreover there is significant differentiation between the 
engagement of the EU members and those who actually are major internal beneficiaries of the 
EU policies are obviously having distinctly lower shares of their participation in ODA. 
Among the most generous donor Member States is Sweden (which allocates 1% of its GNI to 
aid), Luxembourg (0.89%), the Netherlands (0.81%) and Denmark (0.80%).  Some other 
financing of can be found under different chapters of the EU budget as well. Most of the 
additional facilities can be found under its humanitarian aid policy. The Commission using 
general budget provides assistance to the victims of natural or man-made disasters in non-
European Union countries on the sole basis of humanitarian needs. In 2007 the Commission’s 
response to humanitarian crises in more than 70 countries was channelled through 85 
financing decisions for a total amount of EUR 768.5 million. Within the framework of the 
comprehensive reform of the Union’s external assistance programmes, the new European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights was established in 2006. In terms of financial 
scope, it provides for EUR 1.104 billion in support funds for human rights, democratisation 
and rule-of-law-related assistance activities in non-member countries over the period 2007–13. 
In 2007 47 % of the funds were allocated to NGOs, 42 % to UN agencies and 11 % to other 
international organisations.   4
It is therefore important to realise that the assistance offered to the EU new member 
states, countries around the European Union and its prospective members, compared to funds 
offered as support to development, is differently motivated and it is not surprising that it can 
be fund in a different part of EU financial recourses, that is differently managed and subject to 
a different legal regime. Here are also many differences between situations of particular 
countries. Those who recently became members of the EU participate fully in internal policies 
and programmes that the EU finances from the regular budget. They also contribute to this 
budget and take part in decisions concerning the shape of EU policies. Prospective members 
of the EU (either those already negotiating or those having a realistic hope of becoming a 
member) do not participate in the decision making process nor they contribute to the EU 
budget, however they try to follow EU policies and implement EU legislation as a “condition 
sine qua non” of their future adhesion. For the EU it also means that assistance offered serves 
mainly the purpose of preparing these countries to better perform their future role within EU. 
There are also many other countries in the close proximity, who are not considering (and they 
are not considered) any future membership in the EU. But they might have or are in the 
process of elaboration of specific ties with the EU in a form of more or less advanced 
agreement (neighbourhood, cooperation, association etc.) In all these cases EU funds are 
offered because there is an additional motivation of political, economic, cultural or 
geographical nature. The sources of financing are located in different parts of the EU budget, 
most often completely in different places that the money offered for financing of development. 
Most of the money can be drawn from the Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds. These are 
funds allocated by the European Union for two related purposes: support for the poorer 
regions of Europe and support for integrating European infrastructure especially in the 
transport sector. Current financing runs from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013, with a 
€277bn budget for the Structural Funds, and €70bn for the Cohesion Fund. Together with the 
Common Agricultural Policy, the structural and cohesion funds make up the great bulk of EU 
funding, and the majority of total EU spending. It should be noted that the share of the EU 
budget in EU GDP is currently below the 1%, which is a bit more then two times higher then 
share of EU official development assistance.  
 
II. The approach of achieving progress via integration with EU funds in the case of the 
New Member States, associated countries with the EU, and other countries of the region 
using EU funds as an instrument for enhancing cooperation. 
 
Among member states of the region of Central and Eastern Europe there are number of 
different situations that could be categorised as follows: 
•  New Members 
•  Prospective members   5
•  Negotiating countries   
•  Associated countries 
•  Neighbouring countries 
•  Countries having a Cooperation Agreement 
•  Countries negotiating or renegotiating a cooperation Agreement  
•  Countries having any other type of Agreement 
What is common to all of them is that they have an opportunity to use EU funds 
offered rather not as development assistance but being justified and financed differently. Most 
often they have the possibility to use regular budget of the EU and not EDF located outside 
the EU budget lines. These countries also differ in terms of legal status, state of political 
cooperation, intensity of economic ties or even geographic proximity. But the degree of 
intensity of aid may significantly depend not only on the formal status but also on the aims of 
such a assistance that can vary from: 
•  Humanitarian 
•  Alleviation of natural disasters  
•  Development 
•  Strengthening of Democracy 
•  Transformation/ restructuring 
•  Enhancement of cooperation 
•  Creating strong ties with the EU 
•  Preparation for accession 
•  Cohesion within EU 
The more developed aims the bigger amounts of EU funds are involved. However it 
should be noted that the EU has always affected the process of restructuring by applying 
complex set of measures which constitute also a core mechanism of delivery of benefits of 
European integration. EU funds are only one of the components of this mix of measures 
which when put in practice simultaneously and coherently can bring about serious economic 
benefits.  
One of the most important methods of reaching EU objectives is to rely on the 
processes of market integration. While carrying out their economic activity, enterprises take 
advantage of the potential of the single market and as a result of the scale of that market; all 
Member States reach clear economic effects. The single market, in order to function 
effectively, should create the conditions for undisturbed competition in all areas. Only in the 
situation of an open competition, the economically justified choices are made and benefits   6
accrue which result from the allocation of resources between the most effective uses. It is for 
this reason that there are provisions contained in the EU Treaty concerning the free flow of 
goods, services, capital, employers and the establishment of enterprises, etc.  
Simplifying the situation, one could say that the biggest advantages for the European 
economy as a whole result from the ban of disturbing competition by the authorities of the 
respective Member States. In order for the single market to function effectively, a close 
cooperation of the governments of the Member States is needed, so that they would conduct a 
convergent economic policy. The coordination of the policy, both implied and agreed among 
the Member States and taking place de facto as a result of a similar perception onto the 
economic processes is therefore a necessary completion of the integration based on the market 
processes. Coordination is enhanced by community mechanisms and the jointly undertaken 
activities and programmes. This is served by the Open Method of Coordination based on the 
review of policies which enables the promotion of positive examples of an effective economic 
policy; setting out convergent objectives to be reached in the economic processes enhances 
the development potential of the entire EU economy.  
The EU creates as well common and mutually binding economic law. It can determine 
minimum standards and points of references or describe in a precise and unequivocal fashion 
the existing rules of the functioning of enterprises on the single market as well as economic 
authorities of the Member States. In some areas, the EU conducts joint policies, although with 
a varying degree and extent of the instruments used, which are undoubtedly an advanced 
instrument for reaching the desired goals in the scale of the EU. It is only against that 
background that one should perceive the use of budgetary means of the EU as one other 
means of supporting the impact of all dimensions and processes of European integration.  
Undoubtedly the single internal market has the highest significance for the economic 
development of the EU Member States (and as a result for the entire EU). For the single 
market to function effectively, the removal of barriers for economic activity is essential. It 
means limiting regulatory powers of the Member States, so that the national borders would 
not become barriers for the flow of goods, services, capital and persons. It also amounts to the 
limiting of the possibility of the respective states influencing their own economies (not only 
by regulation but also by providing financial assistance to the enterprises) if it makes the 
functioning of the single market difficult.  
   7
 
 
The competition on the single internal market allows for the benefits to be achieved in 
the entire EU economy which result for example from the effects of scale. Unfettered 
competition is always more easily approved by mature economies. Therefore the creation of 
the single market has always required (instead of guaranteeing these freedoms in the treaties) 
being complemented with common rules, standards, coordination of policies or common 
policies and instruments of financial support. When presenting in November 2007 the 
document „ A single market for 21
st century Europe”, the President of the European 
Commission J.M. Barroso argued that the single market brings benefits at the level of about 
500 euro annually for each citizen of the EU which is several times more than the volume of 
the European budget. Even if the benefits of a single market are not evenly distributed it 
becomes quite clear that for New Member States the advantages of the internal market exceed 
a number of times the direct transfer of EU funds. Moreover, effective absorption of EU funds 
depends to a large extent on the implementation of internal market rules by a given new 
member or associated state and access of this country to internal market of the whole EU. 
 Removing barriers for the single market is precisely the reason for supplementing 
liberalization measures by assisting financially weaker countries in order to allow 
development of market infrastructure.  All of these mechanisms and instruments of 
cooperation are integrally tied with each other and their efficiency becomes apparent only 
when they are made operational together. EU funds can ease the coordination of policies and 
actions of the Member States, make the good practices more widely accessible, ease the 
coordination of actions or the application of generally binding principles. They also serve the 
financing of a part of activities within the scope of common policies. EU funds serve, 
although to a differing degree and depending on the type of policy and sector of the economy, 
Convergent policies, 
coordination of actions 
Harmonization of law and 




The hierarchy of the importance of integration instruments for 
the economic development of the EU 
Removing barriers on the internal market for the flow 
of goods and means of production, formulating and 
maintaining the rules of competition, allowing 
increased mutual trade and flow of investments etc.   8
to make easier the functioning of the single market and tighten cooperation in all its forms and 
at all levels.  
Taking this into account means that the synergy between various channels and 
mechanisms of integration can ensure the overall significant outcome. Such synergy is visibly 
present among members of the European Union where all the mechanisms of market 
integration, cooperation in various policy fields as well as common funds. It is less clear in 
the situation of countries which are still outside of European Union. However, also in this 
case, the financial assistance is closely related to liberalization of trade and also to assurance 
of stable conditions for establishment of companies creating thereby conditions for more 
intensive flow of foreign direct investments. This is precisely the content of agreements or 
treaties with the different degree of commitments to liberalization and to approximation that 
were negotiated and applied between particular countries of the region. Generally the higher 
commitments to protect foreign investments, making mutual trade free, and approximate local 
legislation and standards to those of the EU, the bigger are amounts offered as assistance to 
restructuring of these countries. 
This synergy allows for a better use of domestic growth potential and also increases 
the flow of FDI not only from the EU member countries but also from worldwide sources. 
The countries of the region in order to accomplish their transformation, to grow more rapidly 
and to catch up with the level of development with rest of the EU need more investments. EU 
funds cannot be used extensively for the productive purposes, since it could distort markets 
and provoke crowding-out effects. Private capital both domestic and foreign should have the 
major role to play in the development of business. Public funds – EU funds are the public 
funds sui generis – should be mostly used to deliver public goods. The inflow of FDI is of 
paramount importance as representing not only additional capital necessary for development 
but because it brings as well additional benefits like skills of different types (managerial, 
technical knowhow etc.). Better management, organisation and knowledge of market 
conditions allow more efficient operation of economic entities not only on the local market, 
but also on external markets.  The inflow of modern technology is not widely possible without 
FDI as they are often embodied in overall business structures. FDI also offers access to 
foreign markets in practical terms and they can effectively use opportunities created by any 
liberalisation measure applied to trade. Market access in a modern economy is based on 
networks and FDI can deliver links to networks of sales covering a large number of countries. 
It is also possible to expect from the FDI that it takes more seriously account of 
environmental or similar commitments (protection of health, protection of consumers etc.). 
There is already a well established international literature on the transfers and benefits created 
by FDI. In this context it is important to note that there is a clear distinction between the 
market based development for which EU funds play only an auxiliary role as provider of 
better public goods, more suitable infrastructure and generally as “catalisator” of change 
creating opportunities for development and unleashing economic potential. 
Therefore the notion of public goods
2 that has to be visible when implementing EU 
spending policy is the major motive of decisions concerning the direction and purpose of use 
                                                 
2 See W.E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism and European Union: Some reflections, SIEP, Pavia 2002   9
of the EU funds. This also goes further to include only these situations that the EU funds can 
make a real difference as compared to public funds that can be raised and spent locally. It 
therefore leads to another important notion of the European value added as the outcome of 
spending of EU funds. It has a bigger application to countries which are already within the EU 
and less to countries which are outside, but it can be seen less directly in the philosophy 
included in association or cooperation agreements.  
The recourse to the European value added is most visible in the EU’s cohesion policy. 
Very often the applicants for projects financed, even partly, from the European funds, have to 
demonstrate to what extent the projects will create value added not only to their country or 
region but also to the EU at large. In the practice of the assessment of the respective EU 
instruments, it is difficult to apply the concept of the European added value as an explicit 
criterion. The concept of the value added of expenditures made on the territory other than 
one’s own state, is increasingly present in the literature on public finances
3. In the situation of 
a globalizing economy, it is increasingly importantly for all, also those states who cannot 
afford it, to undertake activities which are a response to the contemporary threats. The 
possibility and with the passage of the time also the need to compensate expenses incurred by 
some states so that they would be able to provide “global public goods”. An analytical 
instrument which could be applied in some cases can be based on the concept of incremental 
costs. It allows defining the additional funds needed so that the given country can make a 
choice in favour of a more expensive solution from its point of view but bringing an 
additional benefit in the global context
4. 
When putting forward a draft of the financial perspective in 2004, the European 
Commission attempted to draw more attention to the efficient accumulation of resources in 
the EU. It has made reference not only to the concept of the European added value but pointed 
as well to the premises which could be a source of overcoming barriers in the EU at large. It 
has pointed in particular to the necessity of complementing the functioning of the single 
market by linking up the disjointed national systems in areas such as infrastructure and the 
system of transport services, energy, IT technology, financial services, etc. It has suggested 
the existence of external effects of national actions which do not represent a sufficient 
political and financial return and do not enjoy a sufficient national financing although they 
have a substantial transfrontier dimension. In many cases a synergy effect takes place 
according to the Commission when objectives are implemented at the Union and at the 
national level with an organized and systemic complementarity of actions. EU investments are 
nevertheless needed in the missing interconnections between the national systems, so as to 
reach the effect of scale by putting together the dispersed expenditures, complementing and 
facilitating the national expenditures. As a result, when assessing whether the submitted 
                                                 
3 See P.Jones, Taking self-interest into account. A public choice analysis of international cooperation, [w:] 
The New Public Finance. Responding to Global Challenges, ed. I. Kaul, P. Conceicao, Oxford University 
Press 2006. 
4 See K.King, Compensating countries for the provision of global public services. The tool of incremental 
costs, [w:] The New Public Finance...,   10
components of the 2007-2013 financial perspective, the Commission verified in particular the 











Source: European Commission Website of DG Regio 
 
The differences between different EU regions persist and regional differentiation is 
one of the most significant reasons for the EU to assist poorer members to catch-up with the 
level of development. The map (above) illustrates the magnitude of this phenomenon. With 
the associated countries of Eastern Europe or Balkans the picture would be even more diverse.  
The overall outcome of the cohesion policy translates into increased and accelerated 
development for the countries covered by these policy measures. For Poland, for example, the 
estimated impact of the cohesion policy on the development of the country is considered as 
substantial, particularly in a longer-run perspective.  Some of the researchers suggest that the 
possible impact of the EU funds for New Member States can reach ½ percentage point of 
GDP growth for each 1 percent of GDP of additional funds
6. The relative size of EU transfers 
to the New Member States reaches 4-5% of GDP annually, if agriculture expenditures are also 
taken into account. Generally the poorer a New Member State is the higher the share of EU 
transfers of the country’s GDP.  In Poland the assessment of the impact of EU transfers is 
                                                 
5 See Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013, Brussels, 14.7.2004, COM(2004) 487 final 
6 See review literature on this issue in the Christoph B.Rosenberg and Robert Sierhej, Interpreting EU 
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regularly done by using the HERMIN model which gives results indicating a very substantial 
impact on long term growth (see graph below). Results of other models are not as impressive, 




Source: John Bradley, A contribution to the Round Table on the Future of EU 
Cohesion policy, Warsaw April 2008. 
 
When evaluating the efficiency of cohesion policy, particularly when measured by the 
distance in the level of national income per capita, it is not always possible to distinguish the 
immediate and sizeable impact of that policy on diminishing differences in the levels of 
development. Bridging differences in development cannot be assessed exclusively by the 
level of GNP generated or such parameters as the growth of total demand in a short period of 
time or the impact on the supply in the longer run. Ex ante assessment in which the HERMIN 
model was used has generally shown a significant impact of those funds on the growth of 
cohesion countries. However, in some other studies, the important contribution of the funds 
on growth and development has not always been confirmed
7. However, the targeting of EU 
funds leads to a situation in which their impact on the process of generating GNP is much 
                                                 
7 See for example P. Butzen, E. De Prest, H. Geeroms, Notable trends in the EU budget, NBB Publications, 
Economic Review, September 2006   12
smaller and they enable to a larger extent the less developed regions to create infrastructure, 
take care of the environment, etc. which cannot be immediately and directly translated into 
production activity. Socio-economic cohesion concerns more than equipping the given 
country additional public goods and increasing their accessibility to the citizens. The 
Commission’s Cohesion Report devotes a lot of attention to the qualitative indicators of 
differentiation inside the European Union. In the case of funds designed to assist in the 
catching up process and preventing differences in economic development, it is clear which is 
the direction of the financial flows, from the richer states and regions to the ones which have a 
lower level of development. Even if part of those transfers returns to the richer states in the 
form of orders for services or equipment of various type, the stream of funds will always be 
treated as an expression of European solidarity. The motivation of pure solidarity in the 
situation of a growing number of countries which are behind in their level of development is 
also not without limits. Hence, when the European Commission made its proposal in the 
initial documents for the 2007-2013 financial perspective negotiation to link up cohesion with 
growth and employment, it aimed to demonstrate that the objectives of the policy can be met 
in the course of a parallel process.  
When understood in a simplified manner, cohesion policy is often reduced exclusively 
to thinking along the lines of bridging the gap in the levels of development
8. Hence the 
frequent assessment of the efficiency of that policy through the prism of the dynamics of 
changes in the level of national income and the process of convergence of income and 
possibly levels of employment
9. Cohesion policy contributes as well to other effects, 
including benefits for the neighbouring countries or even the entire EU (construction of 
Trans-European transport corridors, etc.), as well as those which have to do with equipping 
poorer regions with infrastructure with an impact on the quality of life and only indirectly on 
economic growth. It acts towards an appropriate regulatory and institutional environment in 
regions with delays in development. Effective absorption depends to a large extent on the 
institutional sphere. Cohesion funds, in particular after the last enlargement, are increasingly 
directed towards projects which enhance the institutional texture and human capital. The 
effects of investment in those areas are generally apparent in the longer time-frame.  
Cohesion policy funds make it possible for less prosperous countries and regions to 
finance projects which have to do with important EU objectives (apart from economic 
growth) such as the environmental ones, concerning climate change or increase in the share of 
energy from renewable sources
10. The financing of such actions – to some extent required by 
the EU – could have an adverse impact on the perspectives for growth of those countries and 
would not be undertaken without external support. Utilization of EU funds cannot be seen in a 
one-dimensional way as an instrument of redistribution between the more and less prosperous 
regions in the EU only. Such approach makes it difficult to consider this policy as playing a 
                                                 
8 See for example: H.L.F. de Groot, Assessing the effectiveness of the EU cohesion policy, Netherlands’ 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, Presentation made at a conference in Ljubljana, Challenges of the 
EU Budgetary Reform, 2007.  
9 See for example S. Ederveen, J. Gorter, R. de Mooij, R. Nahuis, Funds and Games. The Economics of 
European Cohesion Policy, CPB Netherlands’ Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, April 2002 
10 Such is among others a recommendation of a report by Stephen Hale and Stuart h. Singleton-White, 
Investing in our future: a European budget for climate security, Green Alliance, London , October 2007   13
function as an instrument of transforming certain areas of economic and social life of the 
regions so that they are able to better meet the challenges facing the entire EU and its 
viscinity. Reducing cohesion policy to the question of redistribution is in opposition to the 
conditions attached to the spending of those resources, determining objectives to be met and 
precise programming and tight monitoring of the European Commission when it comes to 
fulfilling the objectives (not only economic rationality and correctness in the accounting for 
the expenses).  
The costs and benefits of implementing acquis communaitaire for the economy and 
the national budgets can not be unequivocally singled out. For example the construction of 
transit roads with a jointly defined durability to the weight of heavier vehicles is a task which 
is realized as part of the regular activity of the state as the manager of the transport 
infrastructure.  
Perhaps, without joint EU decisions, roads with these parameters would not be built in 
some states but only the difference in expenditure to the roads with a higher durability could 
be considered an expense on behalf of the Union at large. Therefore we do not find in the 
budgets of the Member States the relevant items concerning the financing of European 
objectives and policies, except for the contribution and some other elements such as funds for 
co-financing or pre-financing of projects implemented from EU funds. The change which the 
European Union introduces has to do with reordering the preferences in public expenditure 
and making some objectives of the policy priority objectives which they would not have 
become without having subscribed to the common decisions at the European forum. Adopting 
costly EU regulation concerning labour standards, consumer’s rights, environment etc. may in 
a longer run prove to be very beneficial not only for the quality of life, but also for cost of 
medical care, absenteeism at work, etc.; these are also likely to have a positive impact on long 
term growth. 
In this context an assessment of cohesion policy should be made in the context of the 
EU striving for objectives not only in an economic sense but also in relation to solving other 
problems which all Member States face. It is natural that the less prosperous Member States 
will shape their priorities differently than the more prosperous ones. If climate change is 
currently such an important objective, it is clear that in the less prosperous regions goals 
which have to do with economic growth are undoubtedly more urgent. All the more so that 
those states often spend a larger part of their national income on other objectives than the 
prosperous states at a similar point in their development. This means that adjusting priorities 
of economic policy to the objectives seen as important by the EU as a whole can take place 
more easily in the situation in which they are accompanied by external support. The limitation 
of such a support will inevitably lower the ability of those states to subscribe to ambitious 
objectives which the EU agrees within the various areas of its policy. Even if at the political 
level those states for various reasons share the common objectives
11, in practice making them 
operational or implementing them outright could face enormous difficulties and delays. In the 
longer term, this can lead to a degree of political frustration as a result of the difference 
                                                 
11 As for example when it came to the target of energy produced from renewable sources agreed by the 
Spring 2007 European Council at the level of 20 percent by 2020.    14
between the potential of a given country and the political ambitions of other Member States of 
the EU. It is difficult to imagine cohesion of the EU when it comes to economic, ecological, 
social and other objectives without an effort to increase the cohesion of the economies of the 
Member States. At the same time the situation is even more aggravated when it comes to 
countries outside of the EU which are linked with it by an association or other type of 
agreement. They try to implement EU goals, however to a different degree, and emulate EU 
policies which can be less adapted at their stage of development. EU funds in such a situation 
are instrumental to solidify choices which otherwise would be less likely.  
The fact should be noted that differences in the level of development concern not only 
the urgency of the objectives but also change the whole cost structure of their implementation. 
For example, in countries with a well-developed transport infrastructure consisting of a dense 
network of roads, railways, areas of industrial activity, the delimitation of protected areas – 
the so-called Natura 2000 areas – has a different impact on the economic activity than is the 
case of less developed regions. In countries having less dense road infrastructure, the 
delimitation of protected areas precedes the period of infrastructural development which 
means that roads, railways and areas of industrial activity must be adjusted to the existing 
protected areas and not vice versa. Instead of locating the roads so that they cover the shortest 
possible distance (as for example that of the Warsaw - Vilnius railroad), or in place of an 
economically more justified location, they must meander between the ecologically important 
areas. The implementation of the same objectives in a country which is late in its development 
must take place with increased costs.  
The recommendations of the latest „Cohesion Report”
12 of the European Commission 
should be noted in this context, especially when it comes to actions which take into account 
the association overall European goals, community policies and cohesion. The Commission 
notes the need to incorporate more broadly objectives of the Lisbon Strategy and the need to 
fight climate change. In its opinion, instruments of cohesion policy are the most appropriate 
ones to be used for the purpose. Similarly, the need to fulfill objectives concerning a reduction 
in the level of greenhouse gas emissions and other objectives in this area as well as to 
implement the acquis will lead to the necessity of substantial investments. The European 
Commission does not suggest it directly but indirectly for the EU funds should constitute an 
adaptative mechanism. As a result, the Commission refers here to the concept of cohesion 
policy as a policy which can take advantage of the synergy of financial operations from the 
EU budget and performing on the other hand a function which improves the adaptive 
capacity. Ambitious objectives concerning economic development are contained in the 
various EU proposals while at the same time a number of non-economic obligations are 
undertaken which could inhibit that process. The eventual adaptive mechanism contained in 
cohesion policy would make it possible to bring about both of those objectives 
simultaneously. This notion extends beyond cohesion policy and might be part and parcel of 
the expectations formulated towards associated countries or even all who benefit from the EU 
funds. 
                                                 
12 Growing regions – Growing Europe. The Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, 
Communication of the European Commission, May 2007.    15
The EU extends the aim of enhancing economic and social cohesion not only for the 
countries within but outside EU. This means preserving within the EU funds the priority of 
supporting measures addressed towards the less prosperous regions. It should be related to the 
expectations that EU funds are applied to a larger extent to finance actions which have to do 
with the new challenges such as globalisation, climate change, growing energy process and 
demographic problems. Those challenges are currently in the centre of EU attention realizing 
that most of New Member States and particularly less developed associated or cooperating 
countries do not have the same ability to effectively react given the asymmetric impact of 
those challenges. The taking up of additional measures towards the aforementioned 
challenges could in a different fashion impact on the economic and social situation of the 
regions. The less prosperous regions of the EU can benefit from the available instruments of 
cohesion policy which have not necessarily been directed towards tackling those challenges.  
Climate change, if it is not a criterion for the financing as part of the EU policy, can lead to 
placing a lasting burden in the form of the backward installations being financed from the EU 
funds while it should endeavour to eliminate climatic effects and the technological gap 
simultaneously. Similarly in the area of energy, EU funds can and should be directed towards 
desired changes in other areas of EU policy.  
When it comes to funds, where the accepted EU rules require obligatory co-financing, 
the close connection can be seen between expenditures from the national budgets and those 
from the EU budget. The intention of the principle of obligatory co-financing is to limit the 
risk of EU funds being wasted for projects which do not bring substantial effects, to generate 
better results from the limited EU funds by means of engaging national resources of the 
Member States, to increase the sense of responsibility of national authorities for expenses 
covered by the EU public money. These are important arguments but they reflect precisely the 
close connection between public funds at the EU level and those of the local budgets. They 
confirm that the EU budget ties in national expenditures with the community priorities and 
objectives
13. The use of EU funds tends to require reorientation of national expenditures and a 
de facto reorientation of priorities of the national system of public finances
14. All the more so 
that national funds in those countries are particularly limited and the needs of public 
investments greater than in the prosperous states. Therefore making resources from the EU 
budget available facilitates the reaching of objectives decided at the EU level. Given that 
spending those funds requires national resources, there are important shifts in national policy 
priorities. In Poland, for example, resources had to be generated within the state budget 
following accession to the EU for the pre-financing and co-financing of EU funds. This 
phenomenon concerns not only the central but also regional and local budgets. It has led to a 
transitory increase in the budget deficit of the country starting in 2004. In practice, this means 
very often a change in the proportion of expenditure for different objectives, for example an 
increase in the expenses for transport infrastructure, environmental installations or new and 
more environmentally friendly technologies of production with a simultaneous reduction of 
                                                 
13 Multiplication effects of EU direct and indirect instruments to complement national funding, Study  
report, ALMENARA Project No IP/D/FINP/ST/2005-06 
14 See Chapter 3 of the Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, European Commission, May 
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spending (or the growth of spending) on restructuring of some industries, health care or 
education. In reality, not only a reorientation takes place between the different objectives of 
the various areas of public spending but also shifts within relatively uniform groups of 
expenses. For example, at the local level, the building of a ring road or a bridge could absorb 
to such an extent the local public funds that expenses would be limited when it comes to 
maintaining other roads and their renovation. The building of a sewage system or a 
purification plant, obviously very necessary, may absorb the local budget to such an extent 
that financing equally important public works is withheld.  
Recognising entirely the importance of the additionally principle and cofinancing in 
the case of EU funds, one ought to note that this is also a mechanism which supports the 
effective implementation of objectives of integration. Lack of such a mechanism would not 
only make it more difficult to finance some projects but it would also mean that the national, 
regional and local priorities would be different from the objectives of European policy. It is 
therefore also a mechanism for facilitating, especially when it comes to less prosperous states 
and regions, undertaking efforts in restructuring of industries, transformation of economy, 
liberalization of trade and investments as well as making an effort to integrate more closely 
with the EU.  
 
III. Rules and experience of absorption of EU funds as an aid to transform new member 
states, associated countries with the EU as well as countries of the region using EU funds 
as instrument for enhancing cooperation  
 
The concept of absorption capacity has to be seen in number of contexts eg. economic 
(macro and micro), financial, and institutional.  Economic absorption capacity can be 
expressed in terms of proportion of inflow of EU funds to GDP and understood as the ability 
of an economy to absorb transfers of a given size without negative effects over the aggregate 
demand, aggregate supply, volume of economic activity, rate of exchange external balance etc. 
It is therefore more concerned with the ability to absorb macroeconomic effects of the 
transfers of EU funds then transfers as such. In order to avoid macroeconomic turbulences due 
to absorption capacity of a given Member State within the EU, an upper limit of transfers was 
introduced. This limit is defined as percentage of GDP which should be treated as maximum 
even if due to the agreed principles and objective circumstances more funds could be 
allocated to a given country.  
There is also a microeconomic absorption capacity that should not be overstretched. 
The inflow of public funds could result in suboptimal reactions of enterprises in the process of 
utilisation of EU funds and therefore have a negative impact on their functioning of the 
market.   
Financial absorption capacity is generally defined as the ability to pre-finance, and co-
finance of EU supported project on the local and national level. Financial absorption requires 
the ability to generate indispensable matching funds for the execution of the project, which is 
a formal requirement of the EU legislation. Financial capacity to absorb foreign funds in a   17
microeconomic level also involves the ability to support maintenance and running of the 
executed project.  
Administrative capacity is understood as the sufficient ability of central or regional 
and local authorities to develop required plans, programmes and projects, to ensure swift 
execution either directly or through coordination of different agents who are involved in the 
process, as well as to perform all the management and controlling tasks during and after 
spending EU funds.  
It is interesting to note that the resemblance of the legal system, economic mechanism, 
institutional cooperation, especially when being part of overall integration process make a 
significant difference to modalities of the controls of spending patterns and practise.  The 
closer ties, the more likely future membership the bigger approximation of the legal system 
brings more likelihood of less strict control over spending of the EU funds. And the 
differences can stretch from: 
•  Full and ex ante control and direct management  
•  Full control shared management  
•  Partially delegated control and shared management 
•  Partially delegated control and decentralised management 
•  Ex post control and decentralised management 
This to a large extent depends on the level of approximation of the legal system to that 
of the EU and the confidence that the practise is quite similar within the beneficiary and donor 
countries. Again here the situation may differ starting from: 
•  Full application of acquis 
•  Adaptation of legal system towards compliance with the acquis 
•  Sectoral or selective adjustment of regulation to the EU law 
•  Similarities between major rules in some areas in economic regulatory framework 
•  No major additionally initiated resemblance of the legal framework 
 
EU applies a number of guiding principles that are vital for preparing and managing 
utilisation of EU funds. The most elaborated and distinctly applied (more or less obligatory) 
are the principles applied to cohesion policy. However there is clear impact of these principles 
on the use any other funds offered as transfers to New Member States as well as associated or 
other countries of the regions. These principles include the issue of: 
•  Concentration - meaning that the activities should address the most important 
issues and therefore be focused on the least developed or most problematic 
regions, where obviously there is the greatest need for external funds. This is   18
based on assumption that irrespective of the overall amounts EU funds would 
never be able to cover all the needs or all the regions even if it would be fully 
justified, 
•  Additionality – which seems to be the most important principle but also most 
difficult to maintain in the practice of using EU funds. It says that the EU funds 
should not merely replace the national public or private money, but to the 
contrary they should only supplement existing public expenditure. The 
increased EU aid should not diminish spending from other sources, therefore 
after allocation of EU funds overall expenditure for targeted purpose should 
not become smaller than the sum of up to the moment local public expenditure 
and EU ones. It should obviously take macroeconomic considerations into 
account as well as objective development of the area of intervention. However 
it EU funding should always be treated as added to national funding so the 
country with EU assistance could be able to overcome the limits of its own 
financial capacity.  Consistently EU funds cannot lead to saving of national 
expenditure for a given purpose. The national budget is not supposed to save 
on own allocations since they are responsible for the development of areas in 
difficulty or problems of a long term nature. The national budget should also 
be able to continue to address these issues once EU funds are no longer 
available.  
•  Programming – which is a requirement to place any specific decision in a 
wider context of the changes and development of the sector, region or country. 
Decisions on the use of the funds should be planned well before and 
programmed in relations to the expected results in a direct and indirect sense. 
In the case of cohesion policy this includes a requirement of having a 
multiannual, medium-term development plan. The long-term strategic 
objectives should be established and programming should allow for making 
progress in achieving them. The multiannuality provides for the greater 
predictability in the use of EU funds, for security in initiating new and 
consecutive actions, and for coherence of actions over time. The programming 
process generally should have a number of stages and should engage different 
levels of the government. The programming ensures cooperation between these 
levels of government as well as allowing other partners, like the private sector, 
non-governmental organisations or civil society in a wider sense, to become 
involved in this process. The EU budgetary process makes the programming 
easier by operating a multiannual financial framework which currently 
stretches to seven years. Programming has also an impact on the ways how EU 
funds are involved in creating a capacity to manage in a similarly consistent 
manner financial resources originating in a given country or region. 
•  Partnership – requires effective cooperation between EU institutions and the 
recipient of the EU funds. It starts with the choices being made for the strategic 
aims of the use of the funds and continues through the design of programs,   19
activities, instruments of delivery and their implementation up to control and 
ex-post evaluation. Close involvement of private sector and social partners, as 
well as local and regional authorities ensures better targeting the needs and 
more strict control over actual use of EU funds. It results in initiating a project 
which is more needed with a wider dissemination of the benefits. 
•  Efficiency – which is one of the major aspects of any assessment of the 
projects financed by the EU funds. Efficiency is understood not only as 
effective use of the funds in bringing desired results but also as a way of 
verification of the achievement of the assumed outcomes. Taking care of the 
efficient implementation is always an obligation of the recipient entity, but it is 
always monitored by the designated authorities of the recipient countries as 
well as by European institutions (mainly European Commission and Court of 
Auditors). There are a number of ways to increase efficiency; first and 
foremost by close monitoring and by encouraging the replication of other 
projects already successfully implemented.  Frequently, as a way to encourage 
and increase effectiveness, the material incentives for the recipients are created 
in a form of a special performance reserve. 
•  Subsidiarity – which, when applied to the use of EU funds, means the role of 
the EU institution is limited to aspects that require supranational intervention. 
Therefore the European Commission concentrates its assessment on the 
benefits related to the European priorities and rules, whereas the administrative 
capacity is in the hands of local, regional or national administrations.  
Appling all these rules in practice and particularly ensuring their consistent 
implementation requires the development of a quite heavy institutional machinery. Institutions 
responsible for utilisation of EU funds have to operate on all levels of administration: 
European, national, regional, sub-regional, and local. All these institutions should be guided 
not only by similar set of rules but also their activities should be regulated by similar legal 
provisions, in particular related to programming, procuring, bookkeeping, monitoring, 
evaluation, audit and control. Therefore, if the local legislation is different form the EU one, 
the degree of details supervised directly by the EU institutions becomes much more 
significant. If an approximation of legal framework of the beneficiary country is close to that 
of the EU, the decentralisation of programming, spending and even controlling of the EU 
funds is possible. 
Application of the above mentioned principles serves a multi-fold purpose but is 
crucial to the effective absorption of EU funds and using them to the full extent in order to 
satisfy the local, regional or national development needs. There are a number of consequences 
of the consistent application of the above mentioned principle bearing on the areas and focus 
of the funds provided by the European Union. One also has to see the certain logic of gradual 
involvement of the EU funds which allows the next stage to achieve better results thanks to 
the development of the absorptive capacity. Generally the beginning the most important 
engagement of EU funds is in assistance to policy formulation and in building-up the 
administrative capacity.  Most often this is the major bottleneck for the efficient utilisation of   20
EU funds. The development and improvement of infrastructure is seen only as the next step in 
the process. This more clearly enhances economic activity as well as economic and social 
cohesion. The next step therefore is generally composed of all initiatives aimed at improving 
competitiveness of the local economy. This includes action (however always to a limited 
extent) directly linked to the development of economic potential. What comes as a parallel 
thread in this process is the improvement to environmental standards as generally pollution is 
a transnational issue and has obvious externalities. The principles like polluters pays and other 
ways of internalising external effects are frequently parallel to other EU instruments. Some of 
the funds are directed to specific sectors or areas which are the cause of problems. These 
might be areas of industrial decline, or rural areas. Finally the EU devotes a lot of attention 
and money to strengthening of human resources which is vital for successful development in a 
longer perspective.  
 
IV. Final remarks on the applicability of experience concerning EU assistance offered to 
New member States from Central Europe or associated countries from Eastern Europe 
to the Monterrey process. 
 
The cohesion policy of the EU has proved to have had a significant impact on the 
countries concerned. The degree to which this policy has contributed to convergence can still 
be disputed; however this policy cannot be reduced to a pure transfer of EU funds. This policy 
requires a transformation of recipient countries, particularly their public institutions, public 
finances, and legislative regime not limited to the EU funds in direct manner. EU funds have 
to be seen only as a tip of a pyramid of policies and measures which generate benefits for the 
countries in questions (access to internal and liberalisation of markets, common standards and 
legislation etc.). EU funds are instrumental in achieving approximation of regulatory 
frameworks, adjusting to EU requirements and EU policies, and achieving convergence. This 
is probably the most significant difference between EU funds transferred to the New Members 
or associated countries and Official Development Assistance.  
There are number of additional important differences to the rules applied to Official 
Development Assistance and the aid offered to the New Members of the EU, prospective 
members or associated countries. But surely the most important distinction is the discrepancy 
in the political context and motivation of the aid offered to these two groups of countries.  
Even accounting for differences between various categories of countries having formal 
ties with the EU (New Member States, negotiating, associated, countries covered by 
neighbourhood and/or cooperation agreement etc) the gap between these groups of countries 
and all other developing countries is substantial. However, it has to be noted that sometimes 
in relative terms ODA might represent a quite high share of the beneficiaries’ GDP; this is 
mostly in the case for very poor, highly indebted developing countries. Sizeable amounts of 
funds transferred between more wealthy EU members and poorer member or associated 
countries require a quite large administrative machinery able to programme these funds, 
prepare specific projects, ensure efficient contracting, putting projects into motion, monitoring   21
their implementation, make ex-post evaluation and financial audit and control. In some cases 
this institutional back-up becomes very complex and involves large numbers of officials of 
European institutions, national governments, regional authorities and local administration. It 
can be observed, as a general rule, that the more widely EU acquis is transposed into national 
legal systems the more the decentralisation of management of EU funds is possible. This 
contrast with the rules applicable to ODA offered to developing countries. It is not expected 
that all the rules concerning these funds could be adopted so as to replicate the EU legal 
framework, especially those outside of the strict financial requirements. Therefore retention to 
a much larger extent of the management and control of EU ODA can not be surprising. 
Decentralisation and taking over responsibilities require introduction within beneficiary 
countries of a coherent and complex system (legal, institutional, budgetary) which can only be 
justified when the overall size of the transfers makes it sensible. The NMS and associated 
countries have to approximate their own legislation anyhow, so it is done independently of the 
size of EU funds received, which are greater relative to ODA. 
What constitutes a real difference is not the relative size but the more demanding 
conditions and formal requirements related to transfers to the NMS and to the other EU 
associated countries compared with the flows of ODA.  Within the first group the amounts 
transferred depend on the political and formal proximity to the EU.  This however, has to be 
seen in the context of adaptation of EU rules regarding primarily public procurement, audit 
and control of expenditure, but also to a significant degree the adaptation of national legal and 
regulatory frameworks to the acquis communautaire of the EU. This is particularly the case of 
the NMS and candidate countries but to an increasing extent it is visible in the newer 
cooperation agreements. In this sense EU transfers are conditional depending on the 
willingness and capacity of these countries to emulate EU regulations. Conditionality in this 
sense allows integrating the positive impact of the funds, market access, commonality of 
standards and rules as well as all other benefits of the wide EU internal market.  Therefore, 
the catching-up process is not only based on the transfers of money from richer EU members 
to poorer ones, but also on all the other mechanisms of European integration.  
 
*  *  * 
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Annex 
Table 1 Financial Framework 2007–2013 




1. Sustainable Growth  51,267  52,415 53,616 54,294 55,368 56,876  58,303  382,139
1a. Competetiveness for Growth 
and Employment  8,404 9,097 9,754 10,434 11,295 12,153  12,961  74,098
1b. Cohesion for Growth and 
Employment  42,863 43,318 43,862 43,860 44,073 44,723 45,342  308,041
2. Preservation and Management 
of  Natural Resources   54,985  54,322 53,666 53,035 52,400 51,775 51,161  371,344
Of which: market related 
expenditures and direct payments  43,120  42,697 42,279 41,864 41,453 41,047 40,645  293,105
3. Citizenship, freedom, security 
and justice  1,199 1,258 1,380 1,503 1,645 1,797 1,988  10,770
3a. Freedom, security and justice  600  690 790 910 1,050 1,200  1,390  6,630
3b. Citizenship  599  568 590 593 595 597  598  4,140
4. EU as a global player  6,199  6,469 6,739 7,009 7,339 7,679  8,029  49,463
5. Administration  6,633  6,818 6,973 7,111 7,255 7,400  7,610  49,800
6. Compensations  419  191 190           800
Total commitment appropriations  120,702  121,473 122,564 122,952 124,007 125,527  127,091  864,316
as percentage of GNI  1,10%  1,08% 1,07% 1,04% 1,03% 1,02%  1,01%  1,05%
Total payment appropriations  116,650  119,620 111,990 118,280 115,860 119,410  118,970  820,780
as percentage of GNI  1,06%  1,06% 0,97% 1,00% 0,96% 0,97%  0,94%  1,00%
Margin available  0,18%  0,18% 0,27% 0,24% 0,28% 0,27%  0,30%  0,24%
Own resources ceiling as 
percentage of GNI  1,24%  1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24%  1,24%  1,24%
Source: Official Journal of European Union, C 139/10 14.06.2006, Annex 1.    24
Table 2 : EU members Official Development Aid 
2003 2006
ODA GNI ODA GNI
€ ml % € ml %
Austria 447 0,2 814 0,33
Belgium 1640 0,6 1568 0,5
Cyprus 20 , 0 2 30 , 0 2
Czech Republik 80 0,11 125 0,133
Denmark 1 5 4 70 , 8 41 7 1 60 , 8 2
Estonia 10 , 0 1 3 2 0 , 0 2
Finland 494 0,35 672 0,42
France 6 4 2 00 , 4 18 2 8 40 , 4 7
Germany 6 0 0 50 , 2 87 5 6 50 , 3 3
Greece 320 0,21 616 0,33
Hungary 19 0,03 27 0,03
Ireland 446 0,39 856 0,61
Italy 2 1 5 30 , 1 74 7 9 50 , 3 3
Latvia 10 , 0 0 8 50 , 0 3 7
Lithuania 20 , 0 1 1 40 , 0 7
Luxembourg 172 0,81 223 0,9
Malta 30 , 0 7 90 , 1 8
The Netherlands 3524 0,8 3947 0,8
Poland 24 0,01 227 0,1
Portugal 283 0,22 479 0,33
Slovak Republic 13 0,05 33 0,092
Slovenia 20 0,1 29 0,1
Spain 1 7 3 60 , 2 33 2 8 80 , 3 7
Sweden 2124 0,79 2819 1
UK 5 5 6 00 , 3 48 1 4 60 , 4 2
EU 15 TOTAL 32871 0,35 45788 0,43
EU 10 Total 165 0,04 474 0,09
EU 25 TOTAL 33036 0,34 46262 0,42  
Source: Commission website 
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Table 3: Humanitarian aid financing decisions (2007 budget) by geographical area 
(EUR) 
Operation regions  Amount decided for 2007 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (total)  422 760 000 
Africa  2 000 000 
Horn of Africa  217 950 000 
Great Lakes  89 500 000 
West Africa  46 600 000 
Caribbean, Pacific   16 310 000 
Southern Africa, Indian Ocean  50 400 000 
New Independent States, Middle East and Mediterranean  
(total) 
  
124 897 000 
NIS (Chechnya, Caucasus, Tajikistan, etc.)  25 807 000 
Middle East, Mediterranean  99 090 000 
Asia and Latin America (total)  157 366 000 
Asia   117 301 000 
Latin America  40 065 000 
Thematic funding and grants  28 900 000 
Technical assistance (experts and offices)  25 400 000 
Other expenses (audits, evaluations, information, etc.)  9 207 000 
Total  768 530 000 
 Source: Commission DG Budget website   26
 
Graph 1:  Central Europe: Scale and composition of EU transfers in years 2004-2015 
In % of GDP 
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 Source: Republic of Poland. Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 08/131, April 2008 
 
 
 